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Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17031
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/170318e82a72c-a7b6-4238-af03-304c53e275d5
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP98-01.pdf (179759 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 作成者 |
蓼沼, 宏一
× 蓼沼, 宏一 |
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| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | October 1996; Revised version: June 1998 | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||
| 日付 | ||||||
| 日付 | 1998-06 | |||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 1998-01 | |||||
| ページ数 | ||||||
| ページ数 | 24 | |||||
| Edition | ||||||
| 値 | [Revised version] | |||||
| JEL | ||||||
| 値 | D71 | |||||
| JEL | ||||||
| 値 | D63 | |||||
| JEL | ||||||
| 値 | D61 | |||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||
| 値 | The Pareto efficiency criterion is often in conflict with the equity criteria as no-envy or as egalitarian-equivalence: An allocation x that is Pareto superior to another allocation y can be inferior to y in consideration of equity. This paper formalizes two differnet principles of social choice under possible conflict of efficiency and equity. The efficiency-first principle requires that we should always select from efficient allocations, and when the efficiency criterion is not at all effective as a guide for selection, i.e., when all the available allocations are efficient or there is no efficient allocation, we should apply an equity criterion to choose desirable allocations. The equity-first principle reverses the lexicographic order of application of the two criteria. We examine rationality of the social choice rules satisfying these two principles. It is shown that the degree of rationality varies widely depending on which principle the social choice rules represent. Several impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization theorem are obtained. | |||||
