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A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17014
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17014d45d9535-a59d-44b9-b5b5-a3f9130fa774
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP05-01.pdf (372309 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
岡田, 章
× 岡田, 章
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Nash bargaining solution | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Nash program | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | coalition | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | externality | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | core | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | April, 2005; August 2005 (revised) | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2005-08 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2005-01 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 45 | |||||||||
| Edition | ||||||||||
| 値 | [Revised version] | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | We present a noncooperative foundation of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for a general n-person cooperative game in strategic form in which coalitions exert externalities. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach leads to a new concept of the core, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game in which any deviating coalition anticipates the Nash bargaining solution behavior of the complementary coalition. We prove that when the probability of negotiation failure is sufficiently small, there exists uniquely a (totally) efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining model, in which the grand coalition forms with the agreement of the Nash bargaining solution, if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core. The weights of players for the asymmetric Nash solution are determined by their likelihood to make proposals. | |||||||||
