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Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17008
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/170083dfb4c31-1810-482c-975b-de528726701b
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP07-09.pdf (266100 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 作成者 |
蓼沼, 宏一
× 蓼沼, 宏一 |
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| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
| 主題 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | equity | |||||
| 主題 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | efficiency | |||||
| 主題 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | lexicographic composition | |||||
| 主題 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | choice-consistency | |||||
| 主題 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | path-independence | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||
| 日付 | ||||||
| 日付 | 2007-08 | |||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2007-09 | |||||
| ページ数 | ||||||
| ページ数 | 25 | |||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||
| 値 | In a standard framework of choice theory, we formulate two contrasting principles for social choice under the efficiency-equity trade-off. The equity-first principle states that we should select from equitable allocations if any, but if the equity criterion is not at all effective for selection either because all the available allocations are equitable or because no allocation is equitable, we should select from Pareto efficient allocations. The efficiency-first principle switches the roles of the equity criterion and the efficiency criterion above. We examine the choice-consistency properties, known as Path Independence (Arrow, 1963) and Contraction Consistency (Chernoff, 1954), of the social choice correspondences satisfying the equity-first or the efficiency-first principle. Several possibility and impossibility theorems are obtained, which indicate that possibility of consistent social decisions depends crucially on which principle we take as well as what is the precise notion of equity. | |||||
