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International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17005
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17005e19e952d-f058-4050-b976-4689670f57d7
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP04-02.pdf (308359 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
岡田, 章
× 岡田, 章
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | asymmetric Nash bargaining solution | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | CO2 emissions trading | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | international negotiations | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Kyoto Protocol | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | non-cooperative bargaining games | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2004-08 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2004-02 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 33 | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | We investigate international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction in the Kyoto Protocol by non-cooperative multilateral bargaining theory. The negotiation model has two phases, (i) allocating emission reductions to countries and (ii) international emissions trading. Anticipating the competitive equilibrium of emissions trading, each country evaluates an agreement of reduction commitments. We formulate the negotiation process as an n-person sequential bargaining game with random proposers. We show that there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game and that the equilibrium emissions reduction proposed by every country converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the probability of negotiation failure by rejection goes to zero. The weights of countries in the asymmetric Nash solution are determined by their probabilities to be selected as proposers. Finally, we present numerical results based on actual emission data on the European Union (EU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), Japan and the United States (USA). | |||||||||
