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アイテム
The Bright Side of Private Benefits
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16995
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16995a6497812-65d7-48e8-9d62-db1fe564a37a
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP06-01.pdf (195982 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | The Bright Side of Private Benefits | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
堀, 一三
× 堀, 一三
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | May 1, 2006 | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2006-05 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2006-01 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 27 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | C72 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | D23 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | D82 | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | In many cases, the cost of an agent acquiring information is lower than that for the principal. However, because of a private benefit difference between the principal's and agent's preferences, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent's advantage. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him/her to report it truthfully. As usual, the larger the private benefit, the larger the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, the private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable. | |||||||||
