| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
Fleurbaey, Marc
鈴村, 興太郎
蓼沼, 宏一
|
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
This version: November 2000 (First Version: January 2000) |
|
言語 |
en |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
|
|
日付 |
2000-11 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
|
|
関連名称 |
Discussion papers ; No. 2000-07 |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
32 |
| Edition |
|
|
値 |
[Revised version] |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
D63 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
D71 |
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） |
|
|
値 |
Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution. |
070econDP00-07.pdf (340728 bytes)
