| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
On Blocking Coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
Greenberg, Joseph
Weber, Shlomo
山崎, 昭
|
| アクセス権 |
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|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 出版者 |
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|
出版者 |
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
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|
日付 |
2004-08 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
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|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
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|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
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|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
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|
関連名称 |
Discussion papers ; No. 2004-03 |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
15 |
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） |
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|
値 |
In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α, β between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α and β, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large. |
070econDP04-03.pdf (231985 bytes)
