| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Incentive Efficient Risk Sharing in Settlement Mechanism |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
山崎, 昭
Yamazaki, Akira
|
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 出版者 |
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|
出版者 |
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
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|
日付 |
2001-04 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
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|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
|
|
関連名称 |
Discussion papers ; No. 2001-03 |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
24 |
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） |
|
|
値 |
The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when athird party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address the question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment netwrok. |
070econDP01-03.pdf (294818 bytes)
