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Optimal Copyright Protection: Civil Law vs. Criminal Law
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16936
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/169365a53e5ef-bde2-4a9f-a0e2-3feec46e6fc9
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP07-05.pdf (226340 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Optimal Copyright Protection: Civil Law vs. Criminal Law | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
新井, 泰弘
× 新井, 泰弘
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2007-06 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2007-05 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 29 | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | We consider optimal copyright protection strategies from the government and producer perspectives. Our model assumes that the government sets the penalty for infringement, and that the producer is responsible for monitoring illegal activity. We find that depending on the production cost of the goods, the government should set copyright penalties either to zero or to a level that makes the producer's profit zero. We also show that the social surplus is greater under a civil law scheme than a criminal law scheme when the production cost of the goods is high. On the other hand, it is better to apply penalties under criminal law when the production cost is low. | |||||||||
