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Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16927
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/1692731581bbd-2ba4-46d3-81d1-636f94746204
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP05-02.pdf (147322 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
堀, 一三
× 堀, 一三
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Bilateral Trading | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Cooperative Investment | |||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Contracts | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2005-05 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2005-02 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 8 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | C72 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | D23 | |||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||
| 値 | D82 | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | A bilateral trading model with investment is considered. In the “cooperative” investment version of the model, the seller's investment stochastically determines the buyer's valuation of the good. The value and cost of the good are realized only after the investment is made, and the investment level and the realization of the good's value and cost are private information. I show that under these assumptions, no contract made prior to the investment can simultaneously induce efficient investment and efficient ex-post trade when the buyer's type is continuously distributed. This inefficiency result contrasts sharply with the efficiency result under the standard “selfish” investment model, where the seller's investment stochastically determines the seller's cost. | |||||||||
