| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
丸田, 利昌
岡田, 章
|
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 主題 |
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|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Equilibrium selection |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
stochastic stability |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
unanimity game |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
coordination game |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
collective decision making |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
October 3, 2006 |
|
言語 |
en |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
|
|
日付 |
2006-10 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
|
|
関連名称 |
Discussion papers ; No. 2006-04 |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
23 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
C70 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
C72 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
D70 |
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） |
|
|
値 |
In an (n,m)-coordination game, each of the n players has two alternative strategies. A strategy generates positive payoff only if there are at least m-1 others who choose the same, where m>n/2. The payoff is nondecreasing in the number of such others so that there are exactly two strict equilibria. Applying the adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993) to (n,m)-coordination games, we point out potential complications inherent in many-person games. Focusing on games that admit simple analysis, we show that there is a nonempty open set of (n,m)-coordination games that possess multiple stochastically stable equilibria, which may be Pareto ranked, if and only if m>(n+3)/2, which in turn is equivalent to the condition that there is a strategy profile against which every player has alternative best responses. |
070econDP06-04.pdf (254127 bytes)
