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Downsian Model with Asymmetric Information: Possibility of Policy Divergence
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16914
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/1691450946ac5-98f9-4dad-9f33-926f121fb437
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP08-06.pdf (219644 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Downsian Model with Asymmetric Information: Possibility of Policy Divergence | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
菊地, 和也
× 菊地, 和也
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||
| 日付 | 2008-09 | |||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2008-06 | |||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||
| ページ数 | 36 | |||||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||||
| 値 | This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters are imperfectly informed about economic fundamentals. In this setting, parties' choices of platforms influence voters' behavior not only through voters' preferences over policies, but also through formation of their expectation on the unknown fundamentals. We show that there exist pure-strategy equilibria in this political game with asymmetric information at which the two parties' policies diverge with positive probability. This result is in contrast with the well-known median voter theorem in the classical model of Downsian competition. We also study refinement of equilibria, and identify the perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and the strictly perfect equilibria (Okada, 1981). The Nash equilibria with the strongest asymmetry in the parties' strategies are proved to be strictly perfect. | |||||||||
