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Possibility and Optimality of Agreements in International Negotiations on Climate Change
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16913
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/169137ab25979-c2a3-4515-80ca-c47a6fa8ddb8
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
070econDP04-13.pdf (224544 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Possibility and Optimality of Agreements in International Negotiations on Climate Change | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 作成者 |
蓼沼, 宏一
× 蓼沼, 宏一 |
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| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper supersedes my previous paper distributed under the title, “International Negotiations for Reducing Greenhouse Gases with Emission Permits Trading.” | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||
| 日付 | ||||||
| 日付 | 2005-03 | |||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion papers ; No. 2004-13 | |||||
| ページ数 | ||||||
| ページ数 | 27 | |||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||
| 値 | We build a three-stage model of international negotiations on regulation of the level of total emissions of greenhouse gases, and examine the possibility of a cooperative agreement and the Pareto optimality of the outcome. First, we derive the condition for Pareto optimal allocations, which is an extension of the celebrated Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson condition and Chichilnisky et al.'s (2000) result. Next, we show that if the distribution rule of initial emission permits is the proportional rule to the Nash equilibrium emissions in the noncooperative game, then some cooperative agreement can be reached in the negotiations. However, for many other (equitable) distribution rules, no cooperative agreement is possible. Even if a cooperative agreement is attained, the outcome is rarely Pareto optimal. | |||||
