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A Theory of Political Competition over Military Policy and Income Redistribution
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/15848
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/1584840b33938-4125-4d06-bb4a-76558de6d69a
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
DP503.pdf (490433 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | A Theory of Political Competition over Military Policy and Income Redistribution | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 作成者 |
吉原, 直毅
× 吉原, 直毅
NRID
1000060272770
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| 寄与者 | ||||||||||||
| 寄与者タイプ | Editor | |||||||||||
| 姓名 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | multidimensional political competition games | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | partyunanimity Nash equilibria | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | military expenditure | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ideological concerns | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | This version June 2008 | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | We discuss political competition games between Left and Right parties, in which the policy space is two dimensional. One issue is the choice of proportional tax rate, and the second is the allocation of tax revenue between military policies and social welfare policies. On these political issues, the stylized fact is that left-wing parties prefer higher tax rates and lower military expenditure than do right-wing parties. We examine the kinds of political environments in which this fact can be rationalized as the equilibrium outcome of a given political game. By adopting the notion of the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium [Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001; 2005)], not only voters' economic motivations, but also their ideological positions are shown to be crucial factors in explaining stylized party behavior. | |||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||||
| 日付 | 2008-07 | |||||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion paper series. A ; No. a503 | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11476336 | |||||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||||
| ページ数 | 31 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | C62 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | C72 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | D72 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | D78 | |||||||||||
