| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
伊藤, 秀史
菊谷, 達弥
林田, 修
|
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 権利情報 |
|
|
権利情報 |
Copyright (C)2008, Elsevier Inc. The definitive version is published in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,Vol.22, Issue2, June 2008, DOI:10.1016/j.jjie.2008.03.003. |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Complementarity |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Authority |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Accountability |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Monitoring |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Business group |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Delegation |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
This paper offers an empirical test of complementarities among delegated authority, accountability, and monitoring, using unique survey data collected from group affiliated companies in Japan. The survey provides information about how various decisions are made within business groups, each of which consists of a large core parent firm and its network of affiliated firms such as subsidiaries and related companies. We find some evidence that delegated authority and accountability are complementary, implying that increasing assigned accountability raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority. We also obtain a stronger result that performance is likely to be better under the combination of low authority and low accountability or that of high authority and high accountability than under the “mix and match” combinations where one is low and the other high. We then study the effects of monitoring intensity on the authority-accountability pair and find that performance of the firm with the combination of high authority and high accountability is increasing in monitoring intensity, while the combination of low authority and low accountability is not. This result is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that increasing monitoring intensity raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority and accountability. |
|
言語 |
en |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Elsevier |
| 日付 |
|
|
日付 |
2008-06 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
|
資源タイプ |
journal article |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
AM |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isVersionOf |
|
|
識別子タイプ |
DOI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
10.1016/j.jjie.2008.03.003 |
| 収録物識別子 |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
ISSN |
|
収録物識別子 |
0889-1583 |
| 収録物識別子 |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
NCID |
|
収録物識別子 |
AA10701721 |
| 収録物名 |
|
|
収録物名 |
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies |
| 巻 |
|
|
巻 |
22 |
| 号 |
|
|
号 |
2 |
| 開始ページ |
|
|
開始ページ |
207 |
| 終了ページ |
|
|
終了ページ |
228 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
L23 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
L25 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
M21 |
0100801301.pdf (186429 bytes)
