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Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/14533
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/1453322948921-2bd1-4e59-9adf-d0a2f0afb9fb
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
pie_dp128.pdf (170094 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 作成者 |
蓼沼, 宏一
× 蓼沼, 宏一
NRID
1000050227112
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| 寄与者 | ||||||||||||
| 寄与者タイプ | Editor | |||||||||||
| 姓名 | 世代間問題研究プロジェクト（世代間利害調整） = Setting Options for Fair Distribution of Well-being among Different Generations, Project on Intergenerational Equity | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | This version: September 2002; First version: July 2002 | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas y is not. The equity-first principle reverses the order of application of the two criteria. Adopting egalitarian-equivalence as the notion of equity, we examine rationality of the social preference functions based on the efficiency-first or the equity-first principle. The degrees of rationality vary widely depending on which principle is adopted, and depending on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. We show several impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization of the social preference function introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). We also identify the sets of maximal allocations of the social preference relations in an Edgeworth box. The results are contrasted with those in the case where no-envy is the notion of equity. | |||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||||
| 日付 | 2002-12 | |||||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion Paper ; No. 128 | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11851730 | |||||||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||||||
| ページ数 | 18 | |||||||||||
| Sponsorship | ||||||||||||
| 値 | 科学研究費補助金（特定領域研究） = Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | D71 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | D63 | |||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||
| 値 | D61 | |||||||||||
