| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ(フル)その2(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
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|
タイトル |
Shareholder activism in Japan: social pressure, private cost and organized crime |
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言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
Hilary, Gilles
大鹿, 智基
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| 寄与者 |
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寄与者タイプ |
Editor |
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姓名 |
Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
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言語 |
en |
| アクセス権 |
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アクセス権 |
open access |
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アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 内容記述 |
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内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
This draft: August 15, 2003 |
|
言語 |
en |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
Prior research provides mixed results on the capacity of American shareholder activists to improve managerial behavior. In Japan, however, alternative means of external control (e.g. take-over, litigations) are not as effective as in the U.S. Challenging the management during the annual meeting may be the only option for disgruntled shareholders. Yet, the situation is complicated by the existence of corporate racketeers who disrupt the meetings to black-mail management. Our empirical results indicate that, contrary to governmental expectations, shareholder activism leads to subsequent improvement in corporate governance, informational environment and profitability. It also enables firms to attract more foreign and individual shareholders. This suggests that the Japanese authorities should reverse their policy of discouraging shareholder activism. |
| 出版者 |
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出版者 |
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
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|
日付 |
2003-08 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
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資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
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関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
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関連名称 |
CEI Working Paper Series ; No. 2003-20 |
| 関連情報 |
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|
識別子タイプ |
URI |
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|
関連識別子 |
http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/index.html |
| 収録物識別子 |
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|
収録物識別子タイプ |
NCID |
|
収録物識別子 |
AA11590659 |
| ページ数 |
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ページ数 |
59 |