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Excess Entry, Entry Regulation, and Entrant's Incentive
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13815
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13815c0f59cc7-db7b-430e-bb2e-c2a4c548fa0f
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ(フル)その2(1) | |||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Excess Entry, Entry Regulation, and Entrant's Incentive | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 作成者 |
Kim, Jaehong
× Kim, Jaehong
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| 寄与者 | ||||||||
| 寄与者タイプ | Editor | |||||||
| 姓名 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | Bibliography: p. 15 | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | Excess entry theorem, which shows that the free market can generate too many firms, is a theoretic base for entry regulation. When the current market is a monopoly, entry is considered as excessive if the social welfare under the post-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium, net of entry coast, is lower than that under monopoly. However, this paper argues that, even if this is true, limiting entry is not an optimal choice of the benevolent government. The entrant has an incentive to produce more than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output level to get an entry permission as long as it is still profitable to enter. Therefore, an entry regulation which imposes entry condition, rather than just limiting entry, that the new entrant produces enough to make entry welfare increasing, will be an optimal regulation against excess entry problem. Limiting entry based on the excess entry theorem is a wrong policy, since it ignores the strategic reaction by the new entrant. Entry regulation can cure excess entry problem not by limiting entry but by imposing conditions on entry, since the latter is equivalent to a price regulation on the imperfect post-entry oligopoly market. | |||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2001-01 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||
| 関連名称 | Discussion paper series. A ; No. a402 | |||||||
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| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/ | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11476336 | |||||||
| ページ数 | ||||||||
| ページ数 | 16 | |||||||