| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
The Political Economy of Financial Fragility |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
Feijen, Erik
Perotti, Enrico
|
| 寄与者 |
|
|
寄与者タイプ |
Editor |
|
|
姓名 |
社会科学における統計分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences |
|
|
言語 |
en |
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
October 2005 |
|
言語 |
en |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries. |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
|
|
日付 |
2006-03 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
|
|
関連名称 |
Hi-Stat Discussion paper series ; No. d05-160 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
|
識別子タイプ |
URI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
http://21coe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
43 |
| Sponsorship |
|
|
値 |
21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Program |
D05-160.pdf (456965 bytes)
