WEKO3
アイテム
Voluntary Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance: The Empirical Evidence on Earnings Forecasts
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13578
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13578078499af-28f1-4b29-80c3-c5bfce542233
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
D06-203.pdf (269281 bytes)
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| アイテムタイプ | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-05-20 | |||||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||||
| タイトル | Voluntary Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance: The Empirical Evidence on Earnings Forecasts | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 作成者 |
阿部, 修人
× 阿部, 修人
NRID
1000030323893
× Chung, Yessica C.Y.
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| 寄与者 | ||||||||||||||
| 寄与者タイプ | Editor | |||||||||||||
| 姓名 | 社会科学における統計分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | Voluntary information Disclosure | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | Corporate Governance | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | management earnings forecast | |||||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||||
| 内容記述 | This study investigates the determinants of companies' voluntary information disclosure. Employing a large and unique dataset on the companies' own earnings forecasts and their frequencies, we conducted an empirical analysis of the effects of a firm's ownership, board, and capital structures on information disclosure. Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the custom of cross-holding among companies strengthens entrenchment by managers. We also find that bank directors force managers to disclose information more frequently. In addition, our results show the borrowing ratio is positively associated with information frequency, suggesting that the manager is likely to reveal more when his or her firm borrows money from financial institutions. However, additional borrowings beyond the minimum level of effective borrowings decrease the management's disclosing incentive. | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||||||||
| 日付 | 2007-01 | |||||||||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||||||||
| 関連名称 | Hi-Stat Discussion paper series, No. 203 | |||||||||||||
| Sponsorship | ||||||||||||||
| 値 | 21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Program | |||||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||||
| 値 | G10 | |||||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||||
| 値 | G14 | |||||||||||||
| JEL | ||||||||||||||
| 値 | G18 | |||||||||||||
