| アイテムタイプ |
デフォルトアイテムタイプ(フル)その2(1) |
| 公開日 |
2017-05-20 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Do Directors Perform for Pay? |
|
言語 |
en |
| 作成者 |
Adams, Renée B.
Ferreira, Daniel
|
| 寄与者 |
|
|
寄与者タイプ |
Editor |
|
|
姓名 |
Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
|
|
言語 |
en |
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Directors |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Executive Compensation |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Incentives |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Attendance |
| 主題 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Board Meetings |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
This Version: April 6, 2004 |
|
言語 |
en |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using two non-overlapping data sets on director attendance behavior, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is suprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,200, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our samples. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards. We also find that firms that do not pay meeting fees appear to pay each of their directors approximately $40,000 more than firms that pay meeting fees. This suggests that firms that ignore meeting fees as an incentive device have a tendency to overpay their directors. |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
| 日付 |
|
|
日付 |
2005-09 |
|
日付タイプ |
Issued |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh |
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| 出版タイプ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isPartOf |
|
|
関連名称 |
CEI Working Paper Series ; No. 2005-2 |
| 関連情報 |
|
|
|
識別子タイプ |
URI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/index.html |
| 収録物識別子 |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
NCID |
|
収録物識別子 |
AA11590659 |
| ページ数 |
|
|
ページ数 |
47 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
G34 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
J41 |
| JEL |
|
|
値 |
M52 |