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  2. 070 Working Papers = ワーキングペーパー
  3. CEI Working Paper Series

The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China

http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13475
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/13475
892bb68a-fa88-4602-b5bb-a0314f75ca23
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
wp2006-3a.pdf wp2006-3a.pdf (310259 bytes)
アイテムタイプ デフォルトアイテムタイプ(フル)その2(1)
公開日 2017-05-20
タイトル
タイトル The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China
言語 en
作成者 Fan, Joseph P.H.

× Fan, Joseph P.H.

en Fan, Joseph P.H.
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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Wongb, T.J.

× Wongb, T.J.

en Wongb, T.J.
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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Zhang, Tianyu

× Zhang, Tianyu

en Zhang, Tianyu
City University of Hong Kong

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寄与者
寄与者タイプ Editor
姓名 Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
言語 en
アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
主題
主題Scheme Other
主題 Pyramidal Ownership
主題
主題Scheme Other
主題 Decentralization
主題
主題Scheme Other
主題 China
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 We examine the pyramidal ownership structure of a large sample of newly listed Chinese companies controlled by local governments or private entrepreneurs. Both types of the owners use layers of intermediate companies to control their firms. However, their pyramiding behaviors are likely affected by different property rights constraints. Local governments are constrained by the Chinese laws prohibiting free transfer of state ownership. Pyramiding allows them to credibly decentralize their firm decision rights to firm management without selling off their ownership. Private entrepreneurs are constrained by their lack of access to external funds. Pyramiding creates internal capital markets that help relieving their external financing constraints. Our empirical results support these conjectures. Local governments build more extensive corporate pyramids when they are less burdened with fiscal or unemployment problems, when they have more long-term goals, and when their firm decisions are more subject to market and legal disciplines. The more extensive pyramids are also associated with smaller “underpricing” when the firms go public. Entrepreneur owners construct more complex corporate pyramids when they do not have a very deep pocket - as indicated by whether they are among the top-100 richest people in China.
言語 en
出版者
出版者 Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
日付
日付 2006-08
日付タイプ Issued
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
資源タイプ technical report
出版タイプ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
関連情報
関連タイプ isPartOf
関連名称 CEI Working Paper Series ; No. 2006-3
関連情報
識別子タイプ URI
関連識別子 http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/index.html
収録物識別子
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11590659
ページ数
ページ数 47
JEL
値 D33
JEL
値 G32
JEL
値 G34
JEL
値 L22
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