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The optimal differentiated income taxation for groups categorized based on benefits from public goods
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/27913
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/2791395ff1b98-79fa-4e69-8721-1bf386bae7a5
| Item type | デフォルトアイテムタイプ（フル）その２(1) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2019-06-13 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | The optimal differentiated income taxation for groups categorized based on benefits from public goods | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 作成者 |
OBARA, Takuya
× OBARA, Takuya
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Extensive margin | |||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Optimal nonlinear income taxation | |||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Public goods | |||||||
| 主題 | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Tagging | |||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||||
| 日付 | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2016-05 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Issued | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | NA | |||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_be7fb7dd8ff6fe43 | |||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isPartOf | |||||||
| 識別子タイプ | HDL | |||||||
| 関連識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28211 | |||||||
| 関連名称 | This version has been revised. The new version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/10086/28211. | |||||||
| 関連情報 | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isReplacedBy | |||||||
| 関連名称 | CCES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 64 | |||||||
| JEL | ||||||||
| 値 | H20 | |||||||
| JEL | ||||||||
| 値 | H41 | |||||||
| 抄録（第三者提供不可） | ||||||||
| 値 | This paper examines optimal nonlinear income taxes under the provision of a public good when individuals differ in public goods preferences and earning abilities. We suppose two groups whose benefits from public goods are different, and we consider that the government implement the group-specific income tax schedules. Our main argument is that the government redistributive tastes and the correlation of public goods preferences and earning abilities are especially crucial in differentiating marginal income tax rates. In numerical simulations, we present how these factors affect the shape of the optimal differentiated marginal income tax rates in terms of some social welfare functions. | |||||||
